We examine the effects of information technology material weaknesses on a firm’s reputation by examining how management’s actions before and after disclosure influence investors’ trust in management and perceptions of investment risk. Specifically, we look at the influence of: 1) management taking responsibility for an information technology material weakness, and 2) replacing the CFO with someone with technology expertise. We find that management taking responsibility for a material weakness does not lead to increased trust in management before or after remediation. However, investors perceive more favorable market reactions to remediation when management had previously taken responsibility for the control weakness. Further, we find that replacing the CFO with someone who has technology expertise results in increases in investor trust and improvements in perceptions of investment risk after control weakness remediation. This suggests the importance of sending clear signals to investors that the company is hiring managers with appropriate technology expertise.

我们通过研究管理层在信息披露前后的行为如何影响投资者对管理层的信任和投资风险的认知，来研究信息技术重大缺陷对公司声誉的影响。具体来说，我们研究了以下因素的影响：1) 管理层对信息技术的重大弱点负责，以及 2) 用具有技术专长的人取代 CFO。我们发现管理层对重大缺陷负责并不导致在补救之前或之后增加对管理的信任。然而，当管理层先前对控制弱点负责时，投资者认为市场对补救的反应更有利。此外，我们发现，用具有技术专长的人代替 CFO 会增加投资者的信任度，并在控制弱点补救后改善对投资风险的看法。这表明向投资者发出明确信号的重要性，即公司正在招聘具有适当技术专长的经理。