ABSTRACT

Political dynasties, a salient feature of the electoral politics in many electoral democracies, have critical governance implications. However, careful empirical estimates of the dynasty premium in Indian elections and explanation of their constituency-level demand side (voters) and supply side (political parties) determinants are absent. To fill this gap, we analyze the candidate-level (N = 8251) data on the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and find that a dynastic candidate is a significant 13% more likely to win and has a significant 18%–20% higher vote share than a non-dynastic candidate. This result is robust to consideration of an alternative dynasty variable as outcome, usage of alternative indicators of candidate criminality as controls, and a procedure of deducing bias due to selection on unobservables from selection on observables. In the constituency-level analyses, having a dynastic incumbent legislator in fray and dynasts’ relative wealth increases the probability of a dynastic winner and a more competitive election given the dynastic incumbent reduces it. Voter dissatisfaction, dynasts’ relative wealth, reserved constituency, and given a dynastic incumbent, higher political competition reduce voter preference for dynasts, whereas dynastic entrenchment and dynastic incumbent reduce it. The dynastic incumbent, dynasts’ relative wealth, and voter dissatisfaction significantly increase political parties’ preferences for dynasts.

摘要

政治王朝是许多选举民主国家选举政治的一个显着特征，具有重要的治理意义。然而，缺乏对印度选举王朝溢价的仔细实证估计及其选区层面需求方（选民）和供给方（政党）决定因素的解释。为了填补这一空白，我们分析了 2014 年 Lok Sabha 选举的候选人级别 (N = 8251) 数据，发现王朝候选人获胜的可能性高出 13%，投票份额高出 18%–20%比非王朝候选人。这一结果对于考虑替代王朝变量作为结果、使用候选犯罪的替代指标作为控制以及推断由于从可观察对象的选择中选择不可观察对象的偏差的程序是稳健的。在选区层面的分析中，在位王朝的现任立法者陷入纷争和王朝的相对财富增加了王朝获胜的可能性，而鉴于王朝在位者降低了选举的竞争性。选民的不满、王朝的相对财富、保留的选区和给定的王朝在位者，更高的政治竞争会降低选民对王朝的偏好，而王朝的巩固和王朝在位者会降低它。王朝在位者、王朝的相对财富和选民的不满显着增加了政党对王朝的偏好。王朝的相对财富、保留的选区和给定王朝在位者，更高的政治竞争会降低选民对王朝的偏好，而王朝的巩固和王朝在位者会降低选民的偏好。王朝在位者、王朝的相对财富和选民的不满显着增加了政党对王朝的偏好。王朝的相对财富、保留的选区和给定王朝在位者，更高的政治竞争会降低选民对王朝的偏好，而王朝的巩固和王朝在位者会降低选民的偏好。王朝在位者、王朝的相对财富和选民的不满显着增加了政党对王朝的偏好。