Standard accounts of counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents take them to by trivially true. But recent work shows that nontrivial countermetaphysicals are frequently appealed to in scientific modeling and are indispensable for a number of metaphysical projects. I focus on three recent discussions of counterpossible counterfactuals, which apply counterpossibles in both scientific and metaphysical modeling. I show that a sufficiently developed modal counterpart theory can provide a semantics for a wide range of counterpossibles without any inconsistent possibilities or other forms of impossible worlds. But such a view faces problems: in order for the metaphysical views I discuss to bear weight, there must be a significant difference between the metaphysical possibilities and impossibilities. I will show how the counterpart-theoretic view delineates the possible from impossible, while still making room for the impossible.

中文翻译：

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对应物和对应物：没有不可能世界的不可能

对具有形而上学上不可能的前因的反事实的标准说明使它们几乎为真。但最近的工作表明，非平凡的反形而上学在科学建模中经常被诉诸，并且对于许多形而上学项目来说是不可或缺的。我重点关注最近三个关于反可能性反事实的讨论，这些讨论在科学和形而上学建模中都应用了反可能性。我展示了一个充分发展的模态对应理论可以为广泛的反可能性提供语义，而没有任何不一致的可能性或其他形式的不可能世界。但这样的观点面临着问题：为了使我所讨论的形而上学观点具有分量，形而上学的可能性和不可能之间必须存在显着差异。