In the mid twentieth century, logical positivists and many other philosophers endorsed a simple equation: something was necessary just in case it was analytic just in case it was a priori. Kripke’s examples of a posteriori necessary truths showed that the simple equation is false. But while positivist-style inferentialist approaches to logic and mathematics remain popular, there is no inferentialist account of necessity a posteriori. I give such an account. This sounds like an anti-Kripkean project, but it is not. Some of Kripke’s remarks even suggest this kind of approach. This inferentialist approach reinstates neither the simple equation nor pure conventionalism about necessity a posteriori. But it does lead to something near enough, a type of impure conventionalism. In recent years, metaphysically heavyweight approaches to modality have been popular, while other approaches have lagged behind. The inferentialist, impure conventionalist theory of necessity I describe aims to provide a metaphysically lightweight option in modal metaphysics.

中文翻译：

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推论主义、约定主义和后验必然性

在 20 世纪中叶，逻辑实证主义者和许多其他哲学家赞同一个简单的等式：某些东西是必然的，以防它是分析的，以防它是先验的。克里普克的后验必然真理的例子表明这个简单的等式是错误的。但是，虽然实证主义风格的逻辑和数学推理方法仍然很流行，但没有对后验必然性的推理解释。我给这样的一个帐户。这听起来像是一个反克里普克的项目，但事实并非如此。克里普克的一些评论甚至暗示了这种方法。这种推论主义的方法既没有恢复简单的方程式，也没有恢复关于后验必然性的纯粹约定论。但它确实会导致一些非常接近的东西，一种不纯粹的约定俗成的东西。最近几年，形而上学重量级的模态方法很受欢迎，而其他方法却落后了。我描述的推理主义的、不纯粹的约定主义的必然性理论旨在为模态形而上学提供一种形而上学上轻量级的选择。