Recent years have seen a shift in epistemological studies of intellectual self-trust or epistemic self-trust: intellectual self-trust is not merely epistemologists’ tool for silencing epistemic skepticism or doubt, it is recognized as a disposition of individuals and collectives interesting in its own rights. In this exploratory article I focus on a particular type of intellectual self-trust—collective intellectual self-trust—and I examine which features make for valuable or pernicious collective intellectual self-trust. From accounts of the value of individual intellectual self-trust I take three frameworks for evaluating collective intellectual self-trust: an epistemically consequentialist, a virtue-theoretic and a prudential/pragmatic framework (§2). Then I introduce collective intellectual self-trust (§3). Against this background I explain what is distinctive of valuable collective intellectual self-trust (§4) and pernicious collective intellectual self-trust (§5) within the three frameworks. I close by discussing the relation between the three frameworks and argue that evaluating intellectual self-trust requires a multi-perspectival approach constituted by the three frameworks.

中文翻译：

---

宝贵而有害的集体知识分子自信1

近年来，知识分子自信或认识论自我信任的认识论研究发生了转变：知识分子自信不仅仅是认识论者压制认知怀疑论或怀疑的工具，它被认为是个人和集体的一种倾向，其有趣之处在于自己的权利。在这篇探索性文章中，我关注一种特殊类型的知识分子自信——集体知识分子自信——我研究了哪些特征会导致有价值或有害的集体知识分子自信。从对个人知识分子自信的价值的描述中，我采用了三个评估集体知识分子自信的框架：认知结果论、美德理论和审慎/务实框架（§2）。然后我介绍集体知识分子的自信（§3）。在此背景下，我在三个框架内解释了有价值的集体知识分子自信（§4）和有害的集体知识分子自信（§5）的区别。最后，我讨论了三个框架之间的关系，并认为评估知识分子的自信需要由三个框架构成的多视角方法。