Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on the reduction question: that is, whether either belief or credence reduces to the other. This debate, while important, only scratches the surface of the belief-credence connection. Even on the anti-reductive dualist view, belief and credence could still be very tightly connected. Here, I explore questions about the belief-credence connection that go beyond reduction. This paper is dedicated to what I call the independence question: just how independent are belief and credence? I look at this question from two angles: a descriptive one (as a psychological matter, how much can belief and credence come apart?) and a normative one (for a rational person, how closely connected are belief and credence?) I argue that those committed to minimal normative independence should accept more radical normative independence, and that cases of descriptive independence support belief-credence dualism. This suggests that belief and credence are more independent than one might think.

中文翻译：

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论信仰与信任的独立性

许多关于信念和信任之间关系的文献都集中在还原问题上：也就是说，信念或信任是否可以还原为另一个。这场辩论虽然很重要，但只是触及了信仰-信任联系的表面。即使按照反还原二元论的观点，信念和信任仍然可以非常紧密地联系在一起。在这里，我探讨了超越还原的关于信念-信任联系的问题。这篇论文致力于我所说的独立性问题：信念和信任到底有多独立？我从两个角度来看这个问题：一个是描述性的（作为一个心理问题，信仰和信任可以分开多少？）和一个规范性的（对于一个理性的人来说，信仰和信任之间的联系有多紧密？）我认为那些致力于最小规范独立性的人应该接受更激进的规范独立性，并且描述性独立性的案例支持信念-信任二元论。这表明信念和信任比人们想象的更独立。