It is argued that trust is a performative kind and that the evaluative normativity of trust is a special case of the evaluative normativity of performances generally. The view is shown to have advantages over competitor views, e.g., according to which good trusting is principally a matter of good believing (e.g., Hieronymi, 2008; McMyler, 2011), or good affect (e.g., Baier, 1986; Jones, 1996), or good conation (e.g., Holton, 1994). Moreover, the view can be easily extended to explain good (and bad) distrust, where the latter is understood as aimed (narrow-scoped) forbearance from trusting. The overarching framework—which assimilates the evaluative norms of trusting (and distrusting) to performance-theoretic norms—supplies us with an entirely new lens to view traditional philosophical problems about what is involved in trusting and distrusting well and badly, and thus, places our capacity to make progress on problems in this area on a new footing.

中文翻译：

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信任即表现

有人认为，信任是一种表演类型，信任的评价规范性是一般表演的评价规范性的一个特例。该观点显示出优于竞争对手的观点，例如，良好的信任主要是良好的信念（例如，Hieronymi，2008 年；McMyler，2011 年）或良好的影响（例如，Baier，1986 年；Jones，1996 年） ), 或良好的条件 (eg, Holton, 1994)。此外，该观点可以很容易地扩展到解释好的（和坏的）不信任，后者被理解为有目的的（狭义的）容忍信任。总体框架——将信任（和不信任）的评估规范同化为绩效理论规范——为我们提供了一个全新的视角来审视传统哲学问题，即关于信任和不信任的好坏所涉及的内容，因此，将我们的在新的基础上解决这一领域的问题的能力。