According to distributed virtue reliabilism (Palermos, 2020b), epistemic collaborations—such as Transactive Memory Systems and Scientific Research Teams—can be held epistemically responsible at the collective level. This raises the question of whether participants of epistemic collaborations are exempt from being held individually responsible. In response, this paper explores two possible ways in which attributions of individual responsibility may still be appropriate within epistemic collaborations: (I) Individuals can be held epistemically responsible for their individual shortcomings, but no amount of individual epistemic responsibility can replace collective epistemic responsibility. (II) Even if it is denied that participants of epistemic collaborations can be held epistemically responsible at the individual level, they may be held structurally, perhaps morally, and even legally responsible at the individual level for breaking joint commitments necessary for the effective coordination of the epistemic collaboration.

中文翻译：

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认知合作中的责任：是我，是团队还是我们都应该受到指责？

根据分布式美德可靠性论（Palermos，2020b），认知协作——例如交互记忆系统和科学研究团队——可以在集体层面承担认知责任。这就提出了认知合作的参与者是否免于被追究个人责任的问题。作为回应，本文探讨了个人责任归因在认知合作中仍然适用的两种可能方式：(I) 个人可以对他们的个人缺点承担认知责任，但个人认知责任再多也不能取代集体认知责任。(II) 即使否认认知合作的参与者可以举行在个人层面上，他们可能在结构上，也许在道德上，甚至在法律上承担个人层面的责任，因为他们打破了有效协调认知合作所必需的联合承诺。