In her paper “Radical Externalism”, Amia Srinivasan argues that externalism about epistemic justification should be preferred to internalism by those who hold a “radical” worldview (according to which pernicious ideology distorts our evidence and belief-forming processes). I share Srinivasan's radical worldview, but do not agree that externalism is the preferable approach in light of the worldview we share. Here I argue that cases informed by this worldview can intuitively support precisely the internalist view that Srinivasan challenges, offer two such cases, and explain away the externalist-friendly intuitions that Srinivasan's cases solicit. I then articulate and defend a “radical” internalism, arguing that internalists’ aversion to epistemic hubris and emphasis on subjecting one's beliefs to critical scrutiny are especially attractive in realistic cases involving multiple intersecting axes of oppression—that is, precisely the sort of case that permeates our social world. I also argue that externalism's lack of interest in action-guiding principles leaves it with little to offer us in the fight against epistemic oppression.

中文翻译：

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激进的内在主义

在她的论文“激进的外部主义”中，Amia Srinivasan 认为，那些持有“激进”世界观的人应该更喜欢关于认知论证的外部主义而不是内部主义（据此，有害的意识形态扭曲了我们的证据和信念形成过程）。我赞同斯里尼瓦桑激进的世界观，但不同意外在主义是根据我们共有的世界观的更可取的方法。在这里，我认为以这种世界观为依据的案例可以直观地准确地支持斯里尼瓦桑挑战的内在主义观点，提供两个这样的案例，并解释掉斯里尼瓦桑的案例所征求的外在主义友好直觉。然后，我阐明并捍卫了一种“激进的”内在主义，认为内在主义者厌恶认知狂妄自大并强调服从一个人' 在涉及多个相互交叉的压迫轴的现实案例中，他对批判性审查的信念特别有吸引力——也就是说，正是那种渗透到我们社会世界的案例。我还认为，外在主义对行动指导原则缺乏兴趣，这使得它在与认知压迫的斗争中几乎没有什么可以提供给我们的。