It is commonly held that (i) beliefs are revisable in the face of counter-evidence and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions in reliable and predictable ways. Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn't result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counter examples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way that is expected. I offer a view of belief that does not force us to exclude states as real beliefs that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs, and that does not require us to “outsource” the work belief seems to do to other mental states. I propose that we view belief as a type of emotion where emotions are understood a irreducibly blended states, containing representational, motivational and phenomenological elements.

中文翻译：

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作为情感的信念

人们普遍认为 (i) 信念在面对反证时是可以修正的，以及 (ii) 信念以可靠和可预测的方式与行动相关联。鉴于这样的观点，许多人争辩说，如果一种精神状态无法对证据作出反应，或者没有导致典型的或预期的信念行为，那么它毕竟不是一种信念，而是一种不同的状态。然而，人们发现了一些看似相反的例子，这些例子表明弹性信念无法对证据做出反应，或者没有以预期的方式与行动联系起来。我提供了一种信念观点，它不会强迫我们将状态排除 在外我们预先反思认为是信念的信念，不需要我们将信念似乎对其他心理状态所做的工作“外包”。我建议我们将信念视为一种情绪，其中情绪被理解为不可还原的混合状态，包含表征、动机和现象学元素。