Much of what we know results from information sources on which we epistemically rely. This fact about epistemic reliance, however, stands in tension with a very powerful intuition governing knowledge, an intuition that Pritchard (e.g., 2010) has termed the “ability intuition,” the idea that a believer's “reliable cognitive faculties are the most salient part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to [their] believing the truth” (Vaesen, 2011, p. 518; compare Greco, 2003; 2009; 2010). In this paper I suggest that this tension may indeed be ineliminable. I proceed by canvassing some representative attempts to reconcile epistemic reliance and the ability intuition. In doing so, I suggest that all of these attempts founder on one or the other of two elements of what I've previously described (Shieber, 2013, 2015) as a “personalist presumption” in discussions of social epistemology: an excessive focus on (i) reliability filters within the persons who are the recipients of information or (ii) on reliable truth-tracking and -conveying abilities in the persons who are the transmitters of information. In conclusion, I suggest how best to resolve the tension: by abandoning the ability intuition.

中文翻译：

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挑战能力直觉：从个人到扩展再到分布式的信念形成过程

我们所知道的大部分知识都来自我们在认知上所依赖的信息来源。然而，这一关于认知依赖的事实与支配知识的非常强大的直觉处于紧张状态，这种直觉被 Pritchard（例如，2010 年）称为“能力直觉”，即信徒的“可靠的认知能力是最突出的部分”导致 [他们] 相信真相的全部原因”（Vaesen，2011 年，第 518 页；比较 Greco，2003 年；2009 年；2010 年）。在本文中，我认为这种紧张可能确实是无法消除的。我首先讨论了一些有代表性的尝试，以调和认知依赖和能力直觉。在这样做时，我建议所有这些尝试都基于我之前描述的两个要素中的一个或另一个（Shieber，2013 年，2015）作为社会认识论讨论中的“个人主义假设”：过度关注（i）作为信息接收者的人的可靠性过滤器或（ii）信息接收者的可靠真相追踪和传达能力信息的传递者。最后，我建议如何最好地解决紧张：放弃能力直觉。