Understanding how stakeholders choose to participate in different policy forums is central to research on complex, polycentric governance systems. In this paper, we draw upon the Ecology of Games Theory (EGT) to develop theoretical expectations about how four incentive structures may guide how actors navigate the world of policy forums. We test these expectations using unique data on a three-mode network of actors, forums, and issues related to climate change adaption in the state of Ohio, in the U.S. Midwest. Results of an exponential random graph model suggest that multilevel closure structures, which are a function of transaction costs and direct benefits, guide actors’ forum participation in ways that can either reinforce sub-optimal, ineffective governance arrangements, or conversely, encourage opportunities for innovation, increase diversity in representation, and facilitate policy learning. From a methodological standpoint, our research highlights the benefits of examining complex governance systems through the more precise approach allowed by three-mode network analysis, which has not been frequently used in research on polycentric governance systems up to this point.

中文翻译：

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理论化多级闭包结构指导论坛参与

了解利益相关者如何选择参与不同的政策论坛是研究复杂的多中心治理系统的核心。在本文中，我们利用博弈论生态学 (EGT) 来发展关于四种激励结构如何指导行为者在政策论坛世界中导航的理论预期。我们使用美国中西部俄亥俄州气候变化适应相关的三模式网络参与者、论坛和问题的独特数据来测试这些预期。指数随机图模型的结果表明，作为交易成本和直接收益的函数的多级封闭结构，引导参与者的论坛参与方式可以加强次优、无效的治理安排，或者相反，鼓励创新机会, 增加代表性的多样性，并促进政策学习。从方法论的角度来看，我们的研究强调了通过三模式网络分析所允许的更精确的方法来检查复杂治理系统的好处，到目前为止，这种方法在多中心治理系统的研究中还没有经常使用。