Philosophers and psychologists often assume that responsibility and blame only apply to certain agents. But do our ordinary concepts of responsibility and blame reflect these assumptions? I investigate one recent debate where these assumptions have been applied—the back-and-forth over how to explain the impact of norms on ordinary causal attributions. I investigate one prominent case where it has been found that norms matter for causal attributions, but where it is claimed that responsibility and blame do not apply because the case involves artifacts. Across six studies (total N=1,492) more carefully investigating Hitchcock and Knobe’s (2009) Machine Case, I find that the same norm effect found for causal attributions is found for responsibility and blame attributions, with participants tending to ascribe both to a norm-violating artifact. Further, the evidence suggests that participants do so because they are using these terms in a broadly normative, but not distinctively moral, way.

中文翻译：

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交叉线：将不良结果归咎于人工制品

哲学家和心理学家经常假设责任和指责只适用于某些代理人。但是我们对责任和责备的普通概念是否反映了这些假设？我调查了最近一次应用这些假设的辩论——关于如何解释规范对普通因果归因的影响的来回讨论。我调查了一个突出的案例，发现规范对因果归因很重要，但声称责任和责备不适用，因为该案例涉及人工制品。在对 Hitchcock 和 Knobe (2009) 机器案例进行更仔细调查的六项研究（总计 N=1,492）中，我发现责任和责备归因与因果归因的规范效应相同，参与者倾向于将两者归因于规范-违反神器。更远，