On many currently popular ontologies of material objects, we share our place with numerous shorter-lived things ("subpeople," to borrow a term from Eric Olson) that came into existence after we did or will go out of existence before we will. Subpeople are intrinsically indistinguishable from possible people, and as several authors (Eric Olson, Mark Johnston, A. P. Taylor) pointed out, this raises grave ethical concerns: it threatens to make any sacrifice for long-term goals impermissible, as well as to undermine our standard practices of punishment, reward, grief, and utility calculation. The aim in this paper is to offer a unified set of solutions to these problems. The paper’s starting point is the "self-making view," according to which our de se beliefs help determine our own spatiotemporal boundaries. This paper argues that the self-making view also plays a key role in the best treatment of the moral problems of subpeople.

中文翻译：

---

白手起家和子民

在许多当前流行的物质对象本体论中，我们与许多寿命较短的事物（“亚人”，借用埃里克奥尔森的一个术语）共享我们的位置，这些事物在我们之前存在或将在我们之前不存在。子人本质上与可能的人没有区别，正如几位作者（埃里克奥尔森，马克约翰斯顿，AP Taylor）所指出的，这引起了严重的道德问题：它可能会为长期目标做出任何牺牲，并且会破坏我们的惩罚、奖励、悲伤和效用计算的标准做法。本文的目的是为这些问题提供一套统一的解决方案。这篇论文的出发点是“自我创造的观点”，根据这种观点，我们的本质信念有助于确定我们自己的时空界限。