Pretrial detention seriously restricts the physical liberty of presumptively innocent people who have yet to be tried and convicted. The Bail Reform Act (BRA) imposes several procedural requirements that must be satisfied before a judge can order the pretrial detention of a federal defendant. At a detention hearing, the BRA allows a judge to order the pretrial detention of an arrestee who poses either a danger to the community or a flight risk. The BRA states unequivocally that a finding of dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, but the statute is silent as to the evidentiary standard for establishing a defendant’s flight risk. In the absence of statutory guidance, the courts of appeals have utilized a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

This Comment contends that the preponderance standard for flight risk is unconstitutional and interpretively incorrect. In cases involving similar government restrictions on physical liberty, the Supreme Court has generally required at least a “clear and convincing evidence” standard to comport with due process. Using these cases as a baseline, this Comment applies the Mathews v. Eldridge due process framework to reveal the constitutional infirmity of the preponderance standard for pretrial flight risk.

In making the interpretive argument for a clear and convincing evidence standard, this Comment dissects the BRA’s legislative history and statutory evolution to show that Congress intended for flight risk and dangerousness to be considered under equivalent standards. This Comment concludes by making a constitutional avoidance argument: there exists (1) a serious question as to the constitutional validity of the preponderance standard for flight risk and (2) a plausible interpretation of the BRA—that flight risk ought to be proven by clear and convincing evidence—that avoids those constitutional concerns.

审前拘留严重限制了尚未审判和定罪的假定无辜者的人身自由。《保释改革法案》（BRA）规定了一些程序要求，在法官可以下令对联邦被告进行审前拘留之前必须满足这些要求。在拘留听证会上，BRA 允许法官下令对对社区构成危险或有逃跑风险的被捕者进行审前拘留。BRA 明确规定，危险性的认定必须有明确和令人信服的证据支持，但该法规没有明确规定被告逃跑风险的证据标准。在没有法定指导的情况下，上诉法院采用了“证据优势”标准。

该评论认为，飞行风险的优势标准是违宪的并且在解释上是不正确的。在涉及政府对人身自由的类似限制的案件中，最高法院通常要求至少有一个“明确和令人信服的证据”标准，以符合正当程序。以这些案例为基准，本评论应用 Mathews v. Eldridge 正当程序框架来揭示审前飞行风险优势标准的宪法缺陷。

在为明确和令人信服的证据标准提出解释性论点时，本评论剖析了 BRA 的立法历史和法定演变，以表明国会打算在同等标准下考虑飞行风险和危险性。本评论最后提出了一个宪法规避论点：存在 (1) 关于飞行风险优势标准的宪法有效性的严重问题，以及 (2) 对 BRA 的合理解释——飞行风险应该通过明确的证据来证明和令人信服的证据——避免了这些宪法问题。