I explore a game-theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each agent’s well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fixed, and hence the overall assessment of strategies becomes ungrounded. A paradigmatic example of this general phenomenon occurs when both players are ‘reflective altruists’, in a sense to be explained. I argue that ungroundedness cannot be captured by standard games with incomplete information, but that it requires the concept of an underspecified game; underspecified games have radically underdetermined matrices. Players locked in ungroundedness will be assumed to engage simultaneously in an implicit second-order game in which they try to coordinate their first-order matrices. If they fail to coordinate, their first-order interaction cannot be recast as a game in the first place.

中文翻译：

---

毫无根据的回报：完美的爱与恨的故事

我探索了一种社交互动的博弈论分析，其中每个代理人的幸福感在很大程度上取决于另一个代理人的幸福感。因此，收益是相互依存的，无法固定，因此对战略的整体评估变得没有根据。这种普遍现象的一个典型例子是当两个参与者都是“反思的利他主义者”时，在某种意义上是可以解释的。我认为，信息不完整的标准博弈无法捕捉到无根据性，但它需要一个未充分指定博弈的概念；未指定的游戏具有根本上未确定的矩阵。被锁定在不接地状态的玩家将被假定同时参与一个隐含的二阶博弈，在该博弈中他们试图协调他们的一阶矩阵。如果他们不能协调，