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Logistics Contracts and the Political Economy of State Failure: Evidence from Somalia
African Affairs ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2022-07-09 , DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adac024 Claire Elder
African Affairs ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2022-07-09 , DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adac024 Claire Elder
Scholars have long sought to understand how economic rents may inhibit the formation of effective and accountable government. Prevailing interpretations of empirical state failure do not adequately account for economic connections and rents. Based on in-depth ethnographic fieldwork and original source material from the Somalia context, this study shows how the dominance of the logistics economy, as a system of ‘graft’ endogenous to state-building, has contributed to empirical state failure. Empirical state failure is characterized by intra-elite struggle, endemic political violence, and insecurity including the threat posed by Islamic extremism. Contributing to the study of political settlements, political clientelism, and business–state relationships in Africa, findings from this study offer new insights for understanding how the dominance of logistics rents and lead firms within a political system may prevent the establishment of legitimate, centralized authorities. These findings contribute to the broader study of Africa’s political economies which have experienced protracted civil war and post-conflict reconstruction. In conclusion, it argues how economic development, procurement reform agendas, and efforts to withhold or withdraw aid through economic sanctions fail to resolve endemic conflict and governance issues due to vested interests, elite fragmentation, and polycentric aid practices. Instead, both government policy and foreign interventions continue to empower lead logistics firms (as skilful political entrepreneurs) that destabilize the Federal Government of Somalia.
中文翻译:
物流合同和国家失败的政治经济学:来自索马里的证据
长期以来,学者们一直试图了解经济租金如何阻碍有效和负责任的政府的形成。对经验性国家失败的普遍解释没有充分考虑经济联系和租金。基于深入的民族志田野调查和索马里背景的原始资料,本研究表明物流经济的主导地位,作为国家建设内生的“嫁接”系统,是如何导致经验性国家失败的。经验性国家失败的特点是精英内部斗争、地方性政治暴力和不安全,包括伊斯兰极端主义构成的威胁。有助于研究非洲的政治解决、政治依附主义和商业与国家关系,这项研究的结果为理解政治体系中物流租金和领先公司的主导地位如何阻碍合法的中央集权机构的建立提供了新的见解。这些发现有助于对经历了旷日持久的内战和冲突后重建的非洲政治经济进行更广泛的研究。总之,它论证了经济发展、采购改革议程以及通过经济制裁扣留或撤回援助的努力如何未能解决由于既得利益、精英分裂和多中心援助实践而导致的地方性冲突和治理问题。相反,政府政策和外国干预继续赋予领先的物流公司(作为熟练的政治企业家)权力,从而破坏索马里联邦政府的稳定。
更新日期:2022-07-09
中文翻译:
物流合同和国家失败的政治经济学:来自索马里的证据
长期以来,学者们一直试图了解经济租金如何阻碍有效和负责任的政府的形成。对经验性国家失败的普遍解释没有充分考虑经济联系和租金。基于深入的民族志田野调查和索马里背景的原始资料,本研究表明物流经济的主导地位,作为国家建设内生的“嫁接”系统,是如何导致经验性国家失败的。经验性国家失败的特点是精英内部斗争、地方性政治暴力和不安全,包括伊斯兰极端主义构成的威胁。有助于研究非洲的政治解决、政治依附主义和商业与国家关系,这项研究的结果为理解政治体系中物流租金和领先公司的主导地位如何阻碍合法的中央集权机构的建立提供了新的见解。这些发现有助于对经历了旷日持久的内战和冲突后重建的非洲政治经济进行更广泛的研究。总之,它论证了经济发展、采购改革议程以及通过经济制裁扣留或撤回援助的努力如何未能解决由于既得利益、精英分裂和多中心援助实践而导致的地方性冲突和治理问题。相反,政府政策和外国干预继续赋予领先的物流公司(作为熟练的政治企业家)权力,从而破坏索马里联邦政府的稳定。