The consensus among spacetime substantivalists is to respond to Leibniz’s classic shift arguments, and their contemporary incarnation in the form of the hole argument, by pruning the allegedly problematic metaphysical possibilities that generate these arguments. Some substantivalists do so by directly appealing to a modal doctrine akin to anti-haecceitism. Other substantivalists do so by appealing to an underlying hyperintensional doctrine that implies some such modal doctrine. My first aim in this paper is to pose a challenge for all extant forms of this consensus position. My second aim is to show what form substantivalism must take in order to uphold the consensus while addressing this challenge. The result is a novel “plenitudinous” substantivalist view, which predicts that certain modal facts about spacetime are vague or indeterminate. I then argue against this view on independent grounds, concluding that substantivalists should reject the consensus position. The paper also discusses the way forward for substantivalists in light of this conclusion.

中文翻译：

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如何成为时空实体主义者

时空实体主义者之间的共识是通过修剪产生这些论点的所谓有问题的形而上学可能性来回应莱布尼茨的经典转变论点，以及它们以洞论点形式的当代化身。一些实体主义者通过直接诉诸一种类似于反个人主义的模态学说来做到这一点。其他实体主义者通过诉诸隐含某种此类模态学说的潜在超内涵学说来做到这一点。我在本文中的第一个目标是对这一共识立场的所有现存形式提出挑战。我的第二个目标是展示实体主义必须采取何种形式才能在应对这一挑战的同时维护共识。结果是一种新颖的“丰富的”实体主义观点，它预测关于时空的某些模态事实是模糊的或不确定的。然后，我以独立的理由反对这种观点，并得出结论，实体主义者应该拒绝共识立场。本文还根据这一结论讨论了实体主义者的前进道路。