ABSTRACTThis study addresses the international debate over whether the rotation of audit firms should be mandatory. Mandatory rotation rules have been adopted by the European Union, but these rules have not been established in the United States. Proponents of the policy believe that a long-tenure auditor-client relationship leads to the auditor building an excessive economic bond with the client, which may then erode auditor independence. Motivated by this claim, I build a theoretical model that compares auditor incentives to issue independent reports under regimes with and without mandatory rotation. The model demonstrates conditions under which mandatory rotation could actually impair auditor independence, contrary to the popular view.

中文翻译：

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审计员任期和强制审计员轮换的约束作用


摘要本研究解决了关于会计师事务所轮换是否应强制执行的国际争论。欧盟已经采用了强制轮换规则，但美国尚未制定这些规则。该政策的支持者认为，长期的审计师与客户关系会导致审计师与客户建立过度的经济联系，从而可能削弱审计师的独立性。受这一主张的启发，我建立了一个理论模型，比较在有和没有强制轮换制度下审计师发布独立报告的激励措施。该模型展示了强制轮换实际上可能损害审计师独立性的条件，这与流行的观点相反。