Abstract Many school districts with centralized school choice adopt strategy-proof assignment mechanisms to relieve applicants from needing to strategize based on beliefs about their own admissions chances. This article shows that beliefs about admissions chances shape choice outcomes even when the assignment mechanism is strategy-proof by influencing how applicants search for schools and that “smart matching platforms” that provide live feedback on admissions chances help applicants search more effectively. Motivated by a model in which applicants engage in costly search for schools and overoptimism can lead to undersearch, we use data from a large-scale survey of choice participants in Chile to show that learning about schools is hard, beliefs about admissions chances guide the decision to stop searching, and applicants systematically underestimate nonplacement risk. We use RCT and RD research designs to evaluate scaled live feedback policies in the Chilean and New Haven choice systems. Twenty-two percent of applicants submitting applications where risks of nonplacement are high respond to warnings by adding schools to their lists, reducing nonplacement risk by 58% and increasing test score value added at the schools where they enroll by 0.10 standard deviations. Reducing the burden of school choice requires not just strategy-proofness inside the centralized system but also choice supports for the strategic decisions that inevitably remain outside of it.

中文翻译：

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集中择校中的智能匹配平台与异质信念

摘要 许多学校选择集中的学区采用策略证明分配机制，以减轻申请人需要根据对自己录取机会的信念来制定策略。本文表明，即使分配机制通过影响申请人搜索学校的方式而具有策略性，关于录取机会的信念也会影响选择结果，并且提供有关录取机会的实时反馈的“智能匹配平台”有助于申请人更有效地搜索。受申请人参与昂贵的学校搜索和过度乐观可能导致搜索不足的模型的启发，我们使用来自智利选择参与者的大规模调查的数据表明，了解学校是困难的，对录取机会的信念指导决定停止搜索，申请人系统地低估了未安置风险。我们使用 RCT 和 RD 研究设计来评估智利和纽黑文选择系统中的规模化实时反馈政策。22% 的申请者在提交未安置风险高的申请时通过将学校添加到他们的名单中来回应警告，将未安置风险降低 58%，并将他们注册的学校的考试分数增加 0.10 个标准差。减轻学校选择的负担不仅需要集中系统内部的战略证明，而且还需要选择支持不可避免地留在它之外的战略决策。22% 的申请者在提交未安置风险高的申请时通过将学校添加到他们的名单中来回应警告，将未安置风险降低 58%，并将他们注册的学校的考试分数增加 0.10 个标准差。减轻学校选择的负担不仅需要集中系统内部的战略证明，而且还需要选择支持不可避免地留在它之外的战略决策。22% 的申请者在提交未安置风险高的申请时通过将学校添加到他们的名单中来回应警告，将未安置风险降低 58%，并将他们注册的学校的考试分数增加 0.10 个标准差。减轻学校选择的负担不仅需要集中系统内部的战略证明，而且还需要选择支持不可避免地留在它之外的战略决策。