We provide causal evidence of an ex ante moral hazard effect of unemployment insurance (UI ) by matching plausibly exogenous changes in UI benefit duration across state-weeks during the Great Recession to high-frequency productivity measures from individual supermarket cashiers. Estimating models with date and cashier-register fixed effects, we identify a modest but statistically significant negative relationship between UI benefits and worker productivity. This effect is strongest for more experienced and less productive cashiers, for whom UI expansions are especially relevant. Additional analyses from the American Time Use Survey reveal a similar increase in shirking during periods with increased UI benefit durations. (JEL D82, E32, J22, J24, J65, L81)

中文翻译：

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失业保险作为工人违纪装置？来自扫描仪数据的证据

我们通过将大萧条期间各州 UI 福利持续时间的看似合理的外生变化与个别超市收银员的高频生产力措施相匹配，提供了失业保险 (UI) 事前道德风险效应的因果证据。估计具有日期和收银台固定效应的模型，我们发现 UI 福利和工人生产力之间存在适度但具有统计学意义的负相关关系。对于经验丰富且生产力较低的收银员来说，这种效果最为明显，对他们来说，UI 扩展尤为重要。美国时间使用调查的其他分析显示，在 UI 福利持续时间增加的期间，偷懒的情况也有类似的增加。(JEL D82、E32、J22、J24、J65、L81)