This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them. (JEL D73, D83, H24, H26, H71, O12, O17)

中文翻译：

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地方精英作为国家能力：城市首领如何利用当地信息来提高刚果民主共和国的税收合规性

本文调查了地方精英和国家代理人在能力低下的州作为收税员之间的权衡取舍。我们研究了一项随机政策实验，将刚果一个大城市的社区分配给城市首领或国家代理人征收财产税。总征收将税收合规性提高了 3.2 个百分点，收入增加了 44%。酋长收受更多贿赂，但并未削弱税收士气或对政府的信任。混合处理部门的结果表明，国家代理人在收款前与酋长协商，结果表明，首席收款人通过使用当地信息更有效地瞄准具有高支付倾向的家庭，而不是更有效地说服家庭支付条件，从而实现了更高的合规性。拜访了他们。(JEL D73、D83、H24、H26、H71、O12、O17)