We examine how strategic buyer behavior affects equilibrium outcomes in a model of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing each buyer to expect to capture a share of future buyer surplus. Many equilibria that exist when buyers consider only their immediate payoffs are eliminated when buyers expect to capture even a modest share of future surplus, and the equilibria that survive are those where long-run market competition is more likely to be preserved. Our results are relevant for antitrust policy and our approach may be useful for future analyses of dynamic competition. (JEL C73, D21, D43, D83, K21, L13, L40)

中文翻译：

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动态价格竞争、边做边学和战略买家

我们研究了战略买家行为如何影响动态价格竞争模型中的均衡结果，在该模型中，卖家通过允许每个买家期望获得未来买家剩余的一部分而从边做边学中受益。当购买者期望获得未来剩余的一小部分份额时，当购买者只考虑他们的直接收益时存在的许多均衡被消除，并且存在的均衡是长期市场竞争更有可能保持的均衡。我们的结果与反垄断政策相关，我们的方法可能对未来的动态竞争分析有用。(JEL C73、D21、D43、D83、K21、L13、L40)