We examine a new dataset of public procurement laws, practice, and outcomes in 187 countries. We measure regulation as restrictions on the discretion of the procuring entities. We find that laws and practice are highly correlated with each other across countries, and better practice is correlated with better outcomes, but laws themselves are not correlated with outcomes. A closer look shows that stricter laws correlate with improved outcomes, but only in countries with low public sector capacity. We present a model of procurement in which both regulatory rules and public sector capacity determine procurement outcomes. In the model, regulation is effective in countries with low public sector capacity, but not in countries with high capacity because it inhibits the socially optimal exercise of discretion to exclude low quality bidders. (JEL D73, H11, H57, K12, K42, O17)

中文翻译：

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法律与实践中的公共采购

我们研究了 187 个国家的公共采购法律、实践和结果的新数据集。我们将监管视为对采购实体自由裁量权的限制。我们发现，各国的法律和实践高度相关，更好的实践与更好的结果相关，但法律本身与结果不相关。仔细观察会发现，更严格的法律与改善结果相关，但仅限于公共部门能力较低的国家。我们提出了一种采购模型，其中监管规则和公共部门的能力决定了采购结果。在该模型中，监管在公共部门能力低的国家是有效的，但在能力高的国家则不然，因为它抑制了社会最优的自由裁量权以排除低质量投标人。（JEL D73，H11，