The phenomenological understanding of empathy as the direct experiencing of the mental states (feelings, intentions, moods) of others eschews the identification of empathy with caring. At the same time, it leaves open the possibility of sadistic pleasure, indifference, or malice as consequences of empathic experience.In this paper, I intend to defend the place of caring as an inseparable part of the empathic experience, specifically when understood as direct perception. My defense relies on (a) conceiving of attentive concern as a perceptual predisposition, and (b) understanding the caring responsiveness of the empathizer as embedded in her direct perception of the empathee's mental states.My claim proceeds by three steps. Firstly, I will present the need to include caring within empathy through the problem that arises from excluding it. Secondly, I will argue for the presence of active responsiveness, inherent in the phenomenological concept of perception and expressed more explicitly in its Gibsonian understanding. Thirdly, I will propose my understanding of attentive concern as a predisposition, which together with the intentionality attributed to the other (itself also a disposition) forms the pre-perceptual basis for identifying empathy with caring.

中文翻译：

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关怀是移情直接感知的默认设置

将移情理解为对他人心理状态（感觉、意图、情绪）的直接体验的现象学理解避免了将移情与关怀等同起来。同时，它留下了施虐快感、冷漠或恶意作为移情体验结果的可能性。在本文中，我打算捍卫作为移情体验不可分割的一部分的关怀，特别是当被理解为直接洞察力。我的辩护依赖于（a）将专注的关注视为一种感知倾向，以及（b）理解移情者的关怀反应嵌入在她对移情者心理状态的直接感知中。我的主张分三个步骤进行。首先，我将通过排除它所产生的问题，提出在同理心中包含关怀的必要性。其次，我将论证主动响应性的存在，它是现象学感知概念所固有的，并在其吉布森式的理解中得到更明确的表达。第三，我将提出我对专注关注作为一种倾向的理解，它与归因于他人的意向性（本身也是一种倾向）一起构成了将同理心识别为关怀的前感知基础。