This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings.

中文翻译：

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认知感受是情感体验

本文提出了认知感受是情感体验的主张。为了建立一些诊断标准，概述了情感体验的特征：效价和唤醒。然后，为了为证明认知感受具有所说的特征铺平道路，解决了来自内省的最初挑战。接下来，本文转向实证研究结果，表明我们可以在通常依赖认知感受的认知任务中观察效价和唤醒的生理和行为代理。最后，有人认为情感属性不仅与认知感受相关，而且事实上，我们利用这些情感属性来执行认知任务。换句话说：所讨论的情感属性构成了认知感受。