Abstract Existing research on mediation finds that mediation by a strong mediator is both more prevalent and more conducive to a negotiated settlement. However, why disputants select a weak mediator remains unclear. From the perspective of the uncertainty mechanism, the nature of mediation is a procedure for sharing private information and reducing disputants’ uncertainty regarding the resolve to continue fighting. Disputants can benefit from mediation through gaining a comparative advantage regarding uncertainty by focusing on either controlling the sharing of their own information or increasing their opponents’ sharing of information. With regard to these two strategic choices, this article argues that the selection of a weak mediator is more likely when disputants prefer controlling the sharing of their information to expanding their opponents’ information sharing. Correspondingly, three potential factors that influence the disputants’ strategic choice of gaining a comparative advantage regarding uncertainty are applied, namely, a previous mediation in the dispute; the dispute’s level of hostility; and the power disparity between the disputants. The author compiles data from the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB, 1918–2015) data set and the International Conflict Management (ICM, 1945–2003) data set for the empirical analysis. The results show that mediation by a weak mediator is more likely when it is the first time that the disputants have submitted to mediation in the dispute and when the dispute’s level of hostility is low. In some cases, a large power disparity between the disputants also makes the selection of a weak mediator more likely.

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为什么要任命弱调解员？减少国际调解不确定性的战略选择

摘要 现有关于调解的研究发现，强有力的调解员进行调解既更普遍，也更有利于协商解决。然而，争论者为何选择弱调解人仍不清楚。从不确定性机制的角度来看，调解的本质是一种共享私人信息的程序，减少争端方对继续战斗决心的不确定性。通过专注于控制自己的信息共享或增加对手的信息共享，争端方可以通过在不确定性方面获得比较优势而受益于调解。关于这两个战略选择，本文认为，当争议者更愿意控制他们的信息共享而不是扩大对手的信息共享时，选择弱调解人的可能性更大。相应地，应用了影响争议双方在不确定性方面获得比较优势的战略选择的三个潜在因素，即争议中的先前调解；争端的敌意程度；以及争论者之间的权力悬殊。作者汇编了国际危机行为（ICB，1918-2015）数据集和国际冲突管理（ICM，1945-2003）数据集的数据进行实证分析。结果表明，当争议双方第一次在争议中提交调解并且争议的敌意程度较低时，由弱调解员进行调解的可能性更大。在某些情况下，争议者之间的巨大权力差距也使得选择弱调解人的可能性更大。