A thin conception of the social pervades much philosophical writing in social epistemology. A thicker form of sociality is to be found in scientific practice, as represented in much recent history and philosophy of science. Typical social epistemology problems, such as disagreement and testimony, take on a different aspect when viewed from the perspective of scientific practice. Here interaction among researchers is central to their knowledge making activities and disagreement and testimony are resources, not problems. Whereas much of the disagreement and testimony literature assumes some conception of evidence, or that it is obvious what evidence is, a focus on scientific practice reveals that determining what counts as evidence and for what is determined through the discursive interactions among researchers. This paper concludes with questions about the assumptions about knowledge, cognitive agents, and the right starting point for epistemological reflection that shape the mainstream social epistemological approaches.

中文翻译：

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什么是社会认识论的社会？

社会认识论的许多哲学著作中都充斥着关于社会的薄弱概念。在科学实践中可以找到一种更厚实的社会性形式，正如最近的科学史和科学哲学所代表的那样。从科学实践的角度来看，典型的社会认识论问题，如分歧和证词，呈现出不同的一面。在这里，研究人员之间的互动是他们的知识创造活动的核心，分歧和证词是资源，而不是问题。尽管大部分分歧和证词文献都假设了一些证据概念，或者证据是什么是显而易见的，但对科学实践的关注表明，确定什么是证据，以及通过研究人员之间的话语互动来确定什么。