Groundwater is a largely unseen common pool resource. Yet, driven by strong economic incentives, whether or not encouraged by existing policies, and the difficulty to exclude others, groundwater users are competing with each other to extract as much as possible, with devastating consequences for its sustainability. The challenges faced for sustainably managing such common pool resources, on which people have established de facto individual rights, are manifold. However, creating a market for trades of some kind in ecosystem services associated with groundwater could actually enhance the protection of this critical resource on the basis that protection can benefit individual groundwater users economically as well as provide a broader public good. This article uses Elinor Ostrom's design principles as an analytical tool to examine how market-based approaches such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) fit with some of the governance models that could be used to protect and enhance groundwater as a common pool resource. It argues that while there are specific design challenges to be overcome, PES as an institutional tool can align with Ostrom's ideas for the governance of groundwater.

地下水是一种在很大程度上看不见的常见水池资源。然而，在强大的经济激励措施的推动下，无论是否受到现有政策的鼓励，以及难以排除其他人，地下水使用者都在相互竞争以尽可能多地提取，这对其可持续性造成了毁灭性的后果。人们已经在这些资源上建立了事实上的个人权利，可持续地管理这些共同池资源面临着多方面的挑战。然而，为与地下水相关的某种生态系统服务交易创建一个市场实际上可以加强对这一关键资源的保护，因为保护可以使地下水个人用户在经济上受益，并提供更广泛的公共产品。本文使用埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆' s 设计原则作为分析工具，用于检查基于市场的方法（如生态系统服务付费 (PES)）如何与一些可用于保护和增强地下水作为公共池资源的治理模式相适应。它认为，虽然需要克服特定的设计挑战，但作为一种制度工具的 PES 可以与 Ostrom 的地下水治理理念保持一致。