People sometimes want to harm other people. This truism points to a blind spot in law and economics scholarship, which generally assumes that people are indifferent to the effects of their actions on other people. Diverse areas of the law, such as hate-crime legislation and constitutional equal protection doctrine, reside in this blind spot because they are premised on the existence of animus. I argue that the assumption of indifference unnecessarily limits law and economics analysis and that it is both possible and fruitful to incorporate animus into law and economics. I show that doing so leads to new insights on criminal deterrence, including the underappreciated benefits of damages as a deterrent for hate crimes and the promise of community-based “solidarity” deterrence schemes. I also show that incorporating animus can extend law and economics into areas of constitutional law that it has neglected. I argue for an economic approach to equal protection analysis that is grounded in the motivations of government actors but that addresses some of the longstanding concerns with intent-based tests. The examples of criminal deterrence and equal protection analysis are illustrative of an agenda for law and economics analysis that more incorporates other-regarding motives more generally.

人们有时想伤害他人。这种不言自明指出了法律和经济学研究的一个盲点，通常假设人们对自己的行为对其他人的影响漠不关心。法律的不同领域，例如仇恨犯罪立法和宪法平等保护原则，都存在于这个盲点，因为它们的前提是存在敌意。我认为，漠不关心的假设不必要地限制了法律和经济学分析，将敌意纳入法律和经济学既是可能的，也是富有成果的。我表明，这样做会导致对刑事威慑的新见解，包括损害赔偿作为对仇恨犯罪的威慑的被低估的好处以及基于社区的“团结”威慑计划的承诺。我还表明，纳入敌意可以将法律和经济学扩展到它忽略的宪法领域。我主张以政府行为者的动机为基础的平等保护分析的经济方法，但它解决了基于意图的测试的一些长期担忧。刑事威慑和平等保护分析的例子说明了法律和经济学分析的议程，该议程更多地包含了更普遍的其他动机。