According to Jean Moritz Müller's The world-directedness of emotional feeling, the reason why emotions do not apprehend or disclose value is that one cannot apprehend what one has already apprehended: the value in question, he claims, is apprehended prior to the emotional feeling. Emotions, then, should not be conceived as apprehending value since they already presuppose awareness of it. I can be acquainted with a fact without feeling aware of the meaning it holds. Yet I argue that only an emotional reaction (e.g., grief) actually registers value or disvalue (e.g., personal loss). My value-responsive concept of emotion is one that Müller rejects. Yet I contend that to recognize the loss of a beloved person, for instance, just is to feel the emotion of grief.

根据让·莫里茨·穆勒 (Jean Moritz Müller) 的《情绪感受的世界导向性》，情绪不能理解或揭示价值的原因是人们无法理解已经理解的东西：他声称，所讨论的价值是在情绪感受之前被理解的。因此，情绪不应被视为对价值的理解，因为它们已经预设了对价值的认识。我可以熟悉一个事实，而不会意识到它的含义。然而，我认为只有情绪反应（例如，悲伤）实际上记录了价值或贬值（例如，个人损失）。我对价值反应的情感概念是穆勒拒绝的。然而，我认为，例如，承认失去了一个心爱的人，只是去感受悲伤的情绪。