What are the institutional features that incentivize established powers to join rising powers’ new institutions? Going beyond alliance versus rivalry, this paper develops a novel theory in answering this question. We argue that the established power must address two primary design issues: 1. how to navigate the control and burden-sharing trade-off and 2. how to limit the potential diffusion of power by rendering the new institution “complementary” to the existing order. To the extent that these issues are resolved in line with the established power’s (EP’s) preferences, the EP is more likely to join the rising powers’ institutions. We support our theory with an in-depth case analysis of the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank, utilizing primarily archival materials. The relatively under-theorized core question has both historical and contemporary relevance. The paper also advances the history of US multilateral economic policy.

中文翻译：

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老牌大国何时支持新兴大国的多边机构？亚洲开发银行的案例

激励既有大国加入新兴大国的新制度的制度特征是什么？本文超越了联盟与竞争，提出了一种新的理论来回答这个问题。我们认为，既定权力必须解决两个主要的设计问题：1. 如何在控制权和分担责任之间进行权衡，以及 2. 如何通过使新机构与现有秩序“互补”来限制权力的潜在扩散. 如果这些问题按照既定大国（EP）的偏好得到解决，那么欧洲议会更有可能加入新兴大国的机构。我们通过主要利用档案材料对日本主导的亚洲开发银行进行深入的案例分析来支持我们的理论。相对缺乏理论化的核心问题既有历史意义，也有当代意义。该论文还推进了美国多边经济政策的历史。