Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common brokers worldwide, party activists and employers, arguing the latter enjoy numerous advantages along both dimensions. Using survey-based framing experiments in Venezuela and Russia, the authors find voters respond more strongly to turnout appeals from employers than from party activists. To demonstrate mechanisms, the article shows that vulnerability to job loss and embeddedness in workplace social networks make voters more responsive to clientelist mobilization by their bosses. The results shed light on the conditions most conducive to effective clientelism and highlight broker type as important for understanding why clientelism is prevalent in some countries but not others.

中文翻译：

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投票经纪人、客户上诉和投票率：来自俄罗斯和委内瑞拉的证据

现代客户主义交流通常由中间人进行——政党活动家、雇主、地方强人、传统领导人等。政客们利用这些经纪人来动员选民，但人们对他们的相对有效性知之甚少。作者认为，经纪人的有效性取决于他们对客户的影响力以及他们监控选民的能力。他们应用他们的理论框架来比较全球最常见的两个经纪人，即政党活动家和雇主，认为后者在这两个方面都享有许多优势。通过在委内瑞拉和俄罗斯进行的基于调查的框架实验，作者发现选民对雇主的投票率呼吁的反应比政党活动家的反应更强烈。为了展示机制，文章表明，失业的脆弱性和工作场所社交网络的嵌入使选民对老板的客户动员反应更加敏感。结果揭示了最有利于有效客户主义的条件，并强调经纪人类型对于理解为什么客户主义在某些国家而在其他国家盛行很重要。