Rideshare drivers pay a proportion of their fares to a ride-hailing platform operator, a commission-based compensation model used by many service providers. To Uber drivers, this commission is known as the Uber fee. By contrast, traditional taxi drivers in most US cities make a fixed payment independent of their earnings, usually a weekly or daily medallion lease, keeping every fare dollar net of lease costs and other expenses. We assess these compensation models using an experiment that offered random samples of Boston Uber drivers opportunities to lease a virtual taxi medallion that eliminates the Uber fee. Some drivers were offered a negative fee. Drivers’ labor supply response to our offers reveals a large intertemporal substitution elasticity, on the order of 1.2, and higher for those who accept lease contracts. At the same time, our virtual lease program was undersubscribed: many drivers who would have benefited from buying an inexpensive lease chose to sit out. We use these results to compute the average compensation required to make drivers indifferent between rideshare and taxi-style compensation contracts. The results suggest that rideshare drivers gain considerably from the opportunity to drive without leasing. (JEL J22, J31, L84, L92)

中文翻译：

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优步与出租车：驾驶员的视角

拼车司机向网约车平台运营商支付一定比例的车费，这是许多服务提供商使用的一种基于佣金的薪酬模式。对于优步司机来说，这笔佣金被称为优步费用。相比之下，美国大多数城市的传统出租车司机都会根据收入进行固定支付，通常是每周或每天一次的牌照租赁，将每一美元的车费扣除租赁成本和其他费用。我们使用一项实验评估这些补偿模型，该实验为波士顿 Uber 司机的随机样本提供了租用虚拟出租车奖章的机会，从而消除了 Uber 费用。一些司机被提供了负费用。司机对我们报价的劳动力供给反应显示出很大的跨期替代弹性，大约为 1.2，对于那些接受租赁合同的人来说更高。同时，我们的虚拟租赁计划订阅不足：许多本来可以从购买廉价租赁中受益的司机选择不参加。我们使用这些结果来计算使司机对拼车和出租车式补偿合同无动于衷所需的平均补偿。结果表明，拼车司机从不租车的机会中获益良多。(JEL J22, J31, L84, L92)