We study voters’ response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru, leveraging variation from a nationwide reform. A smaller fine has a robust, negative effect on voter turnout, partly through irregular changes in voter registration. However, representation is largely unaffected, as most of the lost votes are blank or invalid. We also show that the effect of an exemption from compulsory voting is substantially larger than that of a full fine reduction, suggesting that nonmonetary incentives are the main drivers behind the effectiveness of compulsory voting. (JEL D72, K16, O17)

中文翻译：

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货币激励投票的效果如何？来自全国性政策的证据

我们利用全国改革的变化，研究选民对秘鲁选举弃权罚款的微小变化的反应。较小的罚款会对选民投票率产生强烈的负面影响，部分原因是选民登记的不规则变化。但是，代表性基本上不受影响，因为大多数丢失的选票是空白或无效的。我们还表明，免于强制投票的效果远大于完全减少罚款的效果，这表明非货币激励是强制投票有效性背后的主要驱动力。(JEL D72, K16, O17)