A central issue in designing incentive contracts is the decision to reward agents’ input use versus outputs. The trade-off between risk and return to innovation in production can also lead agents with varying skill levels to perform differentially under different contracts. We study this issue experimentally, observing and verifying inputs and outputs in Indian maternity care. We find that both contract types achieve comparable reductions in postpartum hemorrhage rates, but payments for outputs were four times that of inputs. Providers with varying qualifications performed equivalently under input incentives, while providers with advanced qualifications may have performed better under output contracts. (JEL D82, D86, I12, J13, J16, J41, O15)

中文翻译：

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物以类聚，人以群分？关于不同技能医疗保健提供者的投入和产出激励合同有效性的实验证据

设计激励合同的一个核心问题是奖励代理人的投入使用与产出的决定。生产中风险和创新回报之间的权衡也可能导致具有不同技能水平的代理人在不同的合同下表现出不同的表现。我们通过实验研究这个问题，观察和验证印度产妇保健的投入和产出。我们发现两种合同类型在产后出血率方面都取得了相当的降低，但产出的支付是投入的四倍。具有不同资质的供应商在投入激励下表现相当，而具有高级资质的供应商可能在产出合同下表现更好。(JEL D82、D86、I12、J13、J16、J41、O15)