Traders are often blamed for high prices, prompting government regulation. We study the effects of a government ban of a layer of financing intermediaries in edible oil supply chain in Bangladesh during 2011–2012. Contrary to the predictions of a standard model of an oligopolistic supply chain, the ban caused downstream wholesale and retail prices to rise, and pass-through of the changes in imported crude oil price to fall. These results can be explained by an extension of the standard model to incorporate trade credit frictions, where intermediaries expand credit access of downstream traders. (JEL L13, L14, L66, O13, Q11, Q13, Q17)

中文翻译：

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供应链中的信用配给和传递：来自孟加拉国的理论和证据

贸易商经常被指责为高价，促使政府监管。我们研究了 2011-2012 年孟加拉国政府禁止食用油供应链中的一层融资中介的影响。与寡头垄断供应链标准模型的预测相反，禁令导致下游批发和零售价格上涨，进口原油价格变化的传递下降。这些结果可以通过扩展标准模型以纳入贸易信贷摩擦来解释，其中中介机构扩大了下游贸易商的信贷准入。（JEL L13、L14、L66、O13、Q11、Q13、Q17）