We study the relationship between physician organizational structures and prices negotiated with private insurers. Using variation caused by state-level judicial law changes, we show that a 10 percent increase in the enforceability of noncompete agreements (NCAs) causes 4.3 percent higher physician prices, and declines in practice sizes and concentration. Using two databases containing every physician establishment and firm between 1996 and 2007, linked to negotiated prices, we show that larger practices have lower prices for services with high fixed costs, consistent with economies of scale. In contrast, increases in firm concentration conditional on establishment concentration leads to higher prices. (JEL D24, G22, I11, J44, K22, L13)

中文翻译：

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医师执业组织和协商价格：来自州法律变化的证据

我们研究了医生组织结构与与私人保险公司协商的价格之间的关系。利用州级司法法律变化引起的变化，我们表明，竞业禁止协议 (NCA) 的可执行性增加 10% 会导致医生价格上涨 4.3%，并且执业规模和集中度下降。使用包含 1996 年至 2007 年期间每个医生机构和公司的两个数据库，与谈判价格相关联，我们表明，与规模经济一致，较大的实践具有较高的固定成本的服务价格较低。相反，以企业集中度为条件的企业集中度的提高会导致价格上涨。(JEL D24, G22, I11, J44, K22, L13)