We explore how taste projection—the tendency to overestimate how similar others’ tastes are to one’s own—affects bidding in auctions. In first-price auctions with private values, taste projection leads bidders to exaggerate the intensity of competition and, consequently, to overbid—irrespective of whether values are independent, affiliated, or (a)symmetric. Moreover, the optimal reserve price is lower than the rational benchmark, and decreasing in the extent of projection and the number of bidders. With an uncertain common-value component, projecting bidders draw distorted inferences about others’ information. This misinference is stronger in second-price and English auctions, reducing their allocative efficiency compared to first-price auctions. (JEL D11, D44, D82, D83)

中文翻译：

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拍卖中的私人价值投射

我们探讨了品味预测——高估他人品味与自己的相似程度的倾向——如何影响拍卖中的出价。在具有私人价值的第一价格拍卖中，品味预测会导致投标人夸大竞争强度，从而导致出价过高——无论价值是独立的、附属的还是（a）对称的。此外，最优底价低于合理基准，预测幅度和投标人数量减少。由于具有不确定的共同价值成分，预计投标人会对他人的信息做出扭曲的推论。这种错误推断在二价拍卖和英式拍卖中更为严重，与一价拍卖相比，它们的分配效率降低了。(JEL D11、D44、D82、D83)