We study how political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects public service provision by local governments. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. In education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are 0.05–0.08 standard deviations lower. In contrast, turnover of the mayor’s party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. These findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process. (JEL D72, D73, H75, H76, J45, O17)

中文翻译：

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政治更替、官僚更替和公共服务质量

我们研究了巴西市长选举中的政治更替如何影响地方政府提供的公共服务。利用非连续性回归设计进行近距离选举，我们发现拥有新政党执政的市政当局经历了市政官僚机构的剧变：在多个服务部门以及管理和非管理级别任命了新人员。在教育方面，市政府控制的学校人员更替率的提高伴随着考试成绩降低了0.05-0.08个标准差。相比之下，市长党的更替不会影响当地（非市政）学校。这些研究结果表明，当官僚机构不受政治进程的影响时，政治更替会对公共服务的质量产生不利影响。（JEL D72、D73、