This paper studies competition between firms when consumers observe a private signal of their preferences over products. Within the class of signal structures that induce pure-strategy pricing equilibria, we derive signal structures that are optimal for firms and those that are optimal for consumers. The firm-optimal policy amplifies underlying product differentiation, thereby relaxing competition, while ensuring consumers purchase their preferred product, thereby maximizing total welfare. The consumer-optimal policy dampens differentiation, which intensifies competition, but induces some consumers to buy their less preferred product. Our analysis sheds light on the limits to competition when the information possessed by consumers can be designed flexibly. (JEL D11, D21, D43, D82, D83, L13)

中文翻译：

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消费者信息和竞争限制

本文研究了当消费者观察到他们对产品偏好的私人信号时公司之间的竞争。在导致纯策略定价均衡的信号结构类别中，我们推导出对公司最优的信号结构和对消费者最优的信号结构。企业最优政策放大了潜在的产品差异化，从而放松了竞争，同时确保消费者购买他们喜欢的产品，从而最大化总福利。消费者最优政策抑制了差异化，这加剧了竞争，但会诱使一些消费者购买他们不太喜欢的产品。当消费者拥有的信息可以灵活设计时，我们的分析揭示了竞争的局限性。(JEL D11、D21、D43、D82、D83、L13)