We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, and knapsack constraints. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value the of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained-efficient market-equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair to the extent that constraints treat agents symmetrically. (JEL D47, D61, D63, I11, I21)

中文翻译：

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受约束的伪市场均衡

我们针对受约束的资源配置问题提出了一种伪市场解决方案。我们对约束的处理是一般性的：包括由于考虑学校选择的多样性或课程分配的安排而产生的两级约束；以及建模所需的其他形式的约束，例如室友市场、组合分配问题和背包约束。约束会产生金钱外部性，这些外部性通过价格内部化。代理支付的程度是他们的购买影响均衡价格下相关约束的价值。结果是约束有效的市场均衡结果。在约束对称地对待代理的范围内，结果是公平的。(JEL D47、D61、D63、I11、I21)