We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. (JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)

中文翻译：

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税收和投票率：当决定性的选民留在家中时

我们开发了一个具有内生投票率和内生平台的政治竞争模型。政党权衡激励他们的支持者投票和阻止竞争党的支持者投票。我们表明，后一个目标对于在政治竞赛中具有优势的政党来说尤其明显。因此，对政党的政治支持增加可能会导致采取有利于其对手的政策，从而不对称地解除他们的动员。我们研究了再分配税收对政治经济学的影响。均衡税收政策通常与复员选民的利益相一致。(JEL D63, D72, H23, H24)