This paper studies bargaining with noncommon priors where the buyer projects and exaggerates the probability that her private information may leak to the seller. Letting the buyer name her price first, raises the seller’s payoff above his payoff from posting a price. In seller-offer bargaining, projection implies a partial reversal of classic Coasian comparative static results. Weakening price commitment can benefit the seller and, as long as the relative speed at which imaginary information versus offers arrive does not converge to zero too quickly, frictionless bargaining converges to a fast haggling process which allows the seller to extract all surplus from trade. Bargaining under common prior transparency is instead slow and becomes equivalent to simply waiting. The comparative static predictions are consistent with experimental evidence. (JEL C78, D82)

中文翻译：

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在透明的幻觉下讨价还价

本文研究了与非常见先验的讨价还价，其中买方预测并夸大了她的私人信息可能泄露给卖方的可能性。让买方先说出她的价格，将卖方的收益提高到高于他发布价格的收益。在卖方报价谈判中，预测意味着经典的科斯比较静态结果的部分逆转。削弱价格承诺可以使卖方受益，只要虚构信息与报价到达的相对速度不会太快收敛到零，无摩擦的讨价还价会收敛到一个快速的讨价还价过程，允许卖方从交易中提取所有盈余。在共同的先验透明度下进行谈判反而很慢，并且等同于简单地等待。比较静态预测与实验证据一致。