A proposer requires a veto player’s approval to change a status quo. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer’s preferences. We show that Vetoer is typically given a non-singleton menu, or delegation set, of options to pick from. The optimal set balances the extent of compromise with the risk of a veto. We identify conditions for certain delegation sets to emerge, including “full delegation”: Vetoer can choose any action between the status quo and Proposer’s ideal action. By contrast to expertise-based delegation, Proposer gives less discretion to Vetoer when their preferences are more (likely to be) aligned. (JEL D72, D82)

中文翻译：

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否决谈判中的代表团

提议者需要得到否决者的批准才能改变现状。Proposer 不确定 Vetoer 的偏好。我们展示了 Vetoer 通常有一个非单一的菜单或委托集，可供选择的选项。最优组合平衡了妥协的程度与否决的风险。我们确定了某些授权集合出现的条件，包括“完全授权”：Vetoer 可以在现状和 Proposer 的理想行动之间选择任何行动。与基于专业知识的委派相比，当他们的偏好更（可能）一致时，提议者给予否决者更少的自由裁量权。(JEL D72, D82)