Tanzania’s legislature, or Bunge, has undergone considerable change in recent decades, gradually strengthening to attain unprecedented influence during Jakaya Kikwete’s presidency (2005–2015) only to decline again under President John Magufuli (2015–2021). This article investigates Bunge’s institutional evolution, asking what explains institutional change within an authoritarian legislature, dominated in this case by the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi. Building on recent literature highlighting the influence of elite contestation on legislative outcomes, the article seeks to go further by probing the nature and origins of the elite factions driving legislative institutional change. It uses insights from a recent political settlements literature, as well as older work on African political economy, to outline how changes to Tanzania’s Parliament have both reflected—and magnified—shifting patterns of elite contestation within CCM. These elite power struggles, in turn, vary with changes in the extent of private wealth accumulation and the related expansion of rival patron–client factions. When private accumulation has continued relatively uninhibited, as was true under Kikwete but not Magufuli, then factional contestation intensified and surfaced in parliament, helping to drive legislative institutional strengthening. For this analysis, I use interview and archival data gathered during extensive fieldwork.

中文翻译：

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坦桑尼亚议会的财富、权力和体制变革

近几十年来，坦桑尼亚的立法机构或邦吉发生了相当大的变化，在贾卡亚·基奎特（Jakaya Kikwete）担任总统期间（2005-2015 年）逐渐加强以达到前所未有的影响力，但在约翰·马古富利总统（2015-2021 年）的领导下再次衰落。本文调查了邦吉的制度演变，询问是什么解释了威权立法机构内的制度变化，在这种情况下由执政党 Chama Cha Mapinduzi 主导。基于最近强调精英竞争对立法结果的影响的文献，本文试图通过探讨推动立法制度变革的精英派系的性质和起源更进一步。它使用了来自最近的政治解决文献的见解，以及关于非洲政治经济的旧著作，概述坦桑尼亚议会的变化如何反映并放大了 CCM 内部精英竞争模式的转变。反过来，这些精英权力斗争会随着私人财富积累程度的变化以及对立的赞助人-客户派系的相关扩张而变化。当私人积累继续相对不受约束时，就像在基奎特统治下而不是马古富利统治下那样，派系竞争加剧并在议会中浮出水面，有助于推动立法机构的加强。对于这个分析，我使用了在广泛的实地工作中收集的采访和档案数据。随着私人财富积累程度的变化以及竞争对手赞助人派系的相关扩张而变化。当私人积累继续相对不受约束时，就像在基奎特统治下而不是马古富利统治下那样，派系竞争加剧并在议会中浮出水面，有助于推动立法机构的加强。对于这个分析，我使用了在广泛的实地工作中收集的采访和档案数据。随着私人财富积累程度的变化以及竞争对手赞助人派系的相关扩张而变化。当私人积累继续相对不受约束时，就像在基奎特统治下而不是马古富利统治下那样，派系竞争加剧并在议会中浮出水面，有助于推动立法机构的加强。对于这个分析，我使用了在广泛的实地工作中收集的采访和档案数据。