Existing studies suggest that leaders that have earlier been participants in rebellions have a higher propensity for international conflict than leaders with no such experience. This paper examines whether prior involvement in rebellions will induce leaders to initiate international conflicts during domestic strife. I propose a preference modification approach and argue that rebel leaders’ policy choices during domestic unrest are a product of their pre-existing preferences and contextual factors. Specifically, I claim that the greater preference for conflict abroad during domestic unrest that former rebel leaders display than do their fellow leaders is contingent on the severity level of domestic problems. When facing serious internal unrest, rebel leaders are less likely than their non-rebel counterparts to engage in international conflicts due to the effect that critical domestic strife will have on the former’s perceptions and thus their policy preferences. Intense domestic strife predisposes rebel leaders to engage in both international conflict and domestic measures, which to some extent neutralises their original policy preference of international conflict as the sole policy response. By contrast, non-rebel leaders perceive more efficacy in international conflict during severe domestic unrest and are more likely to initiate an international dispute in that case. Statistical analyses of the international militarised dispute initiations of leaders under domestic strife from 1875 to 2000 reveal strong support for these arguments.

中文翻译：

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选择之战：领袖、叛乱遗产和国内动乱

现有研究表明，较早参与叛乱的领导人比没有此类经历的领导人更容易发生国际冲突。本文研究了先前参与叛乱是否会诱使领导人在内乱期间引发国际冲突。我提出了一种偏好修正方法，并认为叛军领导人在国内动荡期间的政策选择是他们先前存在的偏好和背景因素的产物。具体来说，我声称，前叛乱领导人在国内动乱期间表现出比其他领导人更倾向于在国外发生冲突，这取决于国内问题的严重程度。在面临严重的内乱时，由于严重的国内冲突会对前者的看法和政策偏好产生影响，因此与非反叛领导人相比，反叛领导人不太可能卷入国际冲突。激烈的内讧使叛军领导人倾向于同时参与国际冲突和国内措施，这在一定程度上抵消了他们最初将国际冲突作为唯一政策回应的政策偏好。相比之下，非叛乱领导人认为在严重的国内动荡期间在国际冲突中更有效率，并且更有可能在这种情况下引发国际争端。对 1875 年至 2000 年在国内冲突中领导人发起的国际军事化争端的统计分析显示，这些论点得到了强有力的支持。