A chief reason that the President is insufficiently constrained when exercising statutorily-delegated power, it is claimed, is the Supreme Court’s disallowance of legislative vetoes in its decision in INS v. Chadha, a claim that intensified during the Trump administration. This article challenges this account, arguing that the availability of the legislative veto was less important before Chadha to congressional-executive relations than legal scholars commonly assume, and that, to the extent that the legislative veto was (or would have become) important for checking some exercises of statutorily-delegated authority, Congress has developed a host of effective workarounds in the years since Chadha.

中文翻译：

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重新评估立法否决权：法定总统、外交事务和国会变通办法

据称，总统在行使法定授权时未受到足够约束的一个主要原因是最高法院在 INS 诉 Chadha 案的裁决中不允许立法否决权，这一主张在特朗普政府期间愈演愈烈。本文对这一说法提出了质疑，认为在查达之前，立法否决权的可用性对国会-行政关系的重要性不如法律学者通常认为的那么重要，并且在某种程度上，立法否决权对于检查是否已经（或将会变得）重要一些法定授权的行使，国会在查达之后的几年里制定了许多有效的变通办法。