I begin by arguing that, for Kant, the pure category of substance has both a general content that is in play whenever we think of any entity as a substance (I call this the Subsistence-Power Conception of substance) as well as a more specific content that arises in conjunction with the thought of what Kant calls a positive noumenon (I call this the Inner-Simple Conception of substance). Drawing on this new “Dual Content” account of the pure category of substance, I offer new answers to two contested questions: What is the relation of the pure category to phenomenal substance? What, if any, epistemic gains can we achieve when we apply the pure category to noumena? Regarding the first question, I argue that while phenomenal substance does not qualify as a substance according to the Inner-Simple Conception, it does qualify as one according to the Subsistence-Power Conception. Regarding the second question, I argue that, in the case of the substantiality of positive noumena, Kant’s account allows for justified conditional beliefs involving the Inner-Simple Conception. In the case of negative noumena, it allows for justified existential beliefs involving the Subsistence-Power Conception.

我首先论证，对于康德来说，实体的纯粹范畴既有在我们将任何实体视为实体时都在发挥作用的一般内容（我称其为实体的生存-权力概念），也有一个更具体的内容。与康德所谓的积极本体（我称之为实体的内在简单概念）的思想一起出现的内容。借助对纯物质范畴的这种新的“双重内容”解释，我对两个有争议的问题提供了新的答案：纯范畴与现象物质的关系是什么？当我们将纯范畴应用于本体时，我们能获得什么（如果有的话）认知收益？关于第一个问题，我认为虽然现象实体不符合内在简单概念的实体，根据生存权力概念，它确实有资格成为一个。关于第二个问题，我认为，在积极本体的实体性的情况下，康德的解释允许涉及内在简单概念的正当条件信念。在消极本体的情况下，它允许涉及生存权力概念的正当存在信念。