Qualifications with 'as' or 'qua' are widely used in philosophy, yet how precisely such qualifications work is poorly understood. While extant work on the topic is rife with revisionary assumptions about the nature of individuals, truth, and identity, this article shows that no baroque theory is required to account for such qualifications. I develop and defend a simple theory on which qua-qualifications ascribe relational properties to individuals, and show that the proposal affords a clear metaphysical analysis of the puzzle cases of interest. Moreover, the theory makes adequate predictions about the linguistic behaviour of qua-qualifications and helps us think more clearly about their logic. Since this is more than any extant competing theory can claim, the proposal offers the best account of qua-qualification to date.

带有“as”或“qua”的限定词在哲学中被广泛使用，但人们对这些限定词如何精确地起作用却知之甚少。虽然关于该主题的现有工作充满了关于个人、真理和身份的性质的修正假设，但本文表明不需要巴洛克理论来解释这些限定。我发展并捍卫了一个简单的理论，根据该理论，资格将关系属性归因于个人，并表明该提议为感兴趣的难题案例提供了清晰的形而上学分析。此外，该理论对资格的语言行为做出了充分的预测，帮助我们更清晰地思考其逻辑。由于这比任何现存的竞争理论所能声称的都要多，因此该提案提供了迄今为止对合格资格的最佳解释。